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This article examines the short-term economic impact of alternative fiscal adjustment strategies, with an especial fo-
cus on their effect on economic growth and income distribution. Based on a sample of 53 adjustment episodes oc-
curred in the fifteen EU Member States between 1960-2000, this article shows that different strategies of fiscal ad-
justment bring about different economic consequences. Expenditure-based adjustments that are preceded by bad
economic and fiscal initial conditions, that are accompanied by a devaluation, and that succeed in cutting the least
productive expenditures of the budget, are likely to have anti-Keynesian effects and to be expansionary. Neverthe-
less, they do so at the expense of increasing income inequality. The opposite is true for revenue-based consolida-
tions. The nineties epitomize the story of expansionary fiscal consolidations via strong wealth and credibility effects,
but also the rebirth of the trade-off between growth and equality, mediated by fiscal policy.
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1. Introduction
A central issue on the political economy of fiscal adjustments is whether these adjust-
ments bring about positive or negative economic consequences. And more concretely, if
these adjustments have the same effect (whatever the sign) in terms of economic growth and
income distribution. The answers to these two questions motivate this article.
Theoretical predictions regarding the short-term economic consequences of fiscal con-
solidations are varied and sometimes even contradictory. For example, while standard
Keynesian theory predicts that fiscal adjustments reduce the level of output, supply-side the-
orists sustain the opposite. In their view, if tax cuts and decreasing interest rates accompany
the fiscal adjustment, consolidations can have a crowding-in effect of private investment and
consumption that might eventually have expansionary effects.
Such ambiguity in the theory’s predictions, has made the resolution to these questions a
matter of empirical analysis.
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advanced economies expands from macroeconomic models that estimate the sign of fiscal
multipliers to simulations that try to test the Ricardian equivalence, the most popular strand
of this empirical literature is the one that draws lessons by looking across episodes of fiscal
consolidation, with an especial emphasis on identifying expansionary fiscal adjustments.
Even if the country samples that are included in the analyses differ between studies, most
empirical works published in the nineties identified expansionary fiscal contractions in ad-
vanced economies, confirming the original Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) finding 1.
These works have always focused on the effects that fiscal adjustments have on eco-
nomic output and on its rate of growth, but they have systematically forgotten the possible
impact that budget cuts could have on the distribution of that output. Since fiscal consolida-
tions are more likely to be expansionary when there are important reductions in the most
rigid items of the budget (public wages and social transfers), it is reasonable to expect that
these adjustments could also increase income inequalities. If this was true, there could exist a
trade-off between growth and equality that any government willing to undertake a fiscal con-
solidation had to confront.
Such hypothesis (that there exists a trade off mediated by fiscal adjustments) has never
been tested before. The main purpose of this article is thus to test such hypothesis 2, using
fresh empirical data from the recent experience of fiscal consolidations in Europe.
In order to do so, this article combines different methodologies used by previous empiri-
cal works on the topic, and applies them to a different sample and to a new set of economic
variables 3. Besides the updated time-frame and the focus on EU countries, the article intro-
duces a major important innovation with respect to previous studies: by focusing on the ef-
fects that different budgetary compositions have on the distribution of income after fiscal ad-
justment episodes, the article presents very strong empirical evidence pointing to the
existence of a trade-off between growth and equality mediated by fiscal consolidations.
While expenditure-based adjustments perform better in terms of subsequent economic
growth than do revenue-based adjustments, the latter are less harmful in terms of income dis-
tribution.
Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature related to the effects of fiscal
policy and fiscal adjustments on economic growth and income distribution. Section 3 deals
with the research design, and sections 4 and 5 present the main empirical results. Section 6
summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2. Fiscal Adjustments and the Macroeconomy: What Does the
Literature Say?
The effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy have been subject to a long and fruit-
ful debate. The understanding of the different theoretical contributions to this issue is crucial
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the channels through which fiscal variables influence the economy.
2.1. Fiscal Policy, Fiscal Adjustments and Growth
Fiscal adjustments have significant effects on economic growth both through demand
and supply-side mechanisms.
A natural place to start a review of the theoretical predictions regarding the demand-side
effects of fiscal policy is with the Keynesian approach. The simplest Keynesian model as-
sumes price rigidity and slack in productive capacity, so that output is determined by aggre-
gate demand. In this model, the Keynesian multiplier exceeds one, it increases with the re-
sponsiveness of consumption to current income, and it is larger for a spending increase than
for a tax cut. Ceteris paribus, this framework predicts that fiscal adjustments decrease the
aggregate demand and the level of output.
Non-Keynesian demand-side effects of fiscal policy emerge from new classical models
which address the well-known shortcomings of the Keynesian approach, and in particular its
lack of microeconomic foundations. An important consequence of non-Keynesian effects is
that they can lead to negative fiscal multipliers, which at last could make fiscal adjustments
have an expansionary effect of economic activity, instead of their traditional recessionary
impact.
While some variants of the Keynesian approach recognize the role of expectations (e.g.,
on consumption in life cycle and permanent income models), they typically rely on adaptive
expectations. By comparison, rational expectations tend to bring forward adjustments in
variables that would occur more progressively with adaptive expectations. Thus the lon-
ger-term effects of fiscal policy will matter even in the short-term, and in this connection the
distinction between temporary and permanent policy changes is important. For example,
while a temporary fiscal adjustment that has no long-term effects will not influence expecta-
tions, a permanent fiscal adjustment can add to crowding-in because households and firms
will expect that an initial decrease in interest rates and a deppreciation of the exchange rate
will persist and could become larger (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1987).
Although the analysis of the stabilization role of fiscal policy has traditionally focused
on its demand-side effects, supply-side effects have been also recognized as more important
over the longer-term. This is so because only policies that promote supply-side responses can
address capacity constraints, and their impact is primarily long-term. However, supply-side
effects of fiscal policy can have short-term demand-side consequences as well, due to expec-
tations that longer-term growth will be higher. If a fiscal adjustment is imparted through tax
increases and spending cuts that are good for the supply side, this will tend to decrease fiscal
multipliers, and the adjustment will then be expansionary.
In assessing the long-term impact of fiscal policy on the supply-side, attention should
thus be paid to the way in which changes to labor income taxes affect the supply of labor, and
changes to capital taxes affect saving and investment. In particular, Alesina and Perotti
Fiscal Adjustments and the Short-Term Trade-Off Between Economic Growth and Equality 63(1997) note that increases in labor income taxes can have a significantly negative sup-
ply-side impact in unionized, imperfectly competitive labor markets where before-tax
wages, and hence labor costs, also increase to reflect the higher taxes. In such circumstances
a better adjustment strategy would be to reduce government employment (thereby reducing
labor demand, weakening unions, lowering wages, and thus increasing profitability), since it
will most likely be a source of non-Keynesian effects (Lane and Perotti, 1996).
In terms of the supply-side effects of fiscal consolidations, attention should also be paid
to the fact that spending on public goods and other goods with positive externalities can lead
to higher growth, as is demonstrated in models where the government invests in both physi-
cal and human capital (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989; Lucas, 1988).
Despite all these new theoretical approaches that explain both the demand and sup-
ply-side mechanisms that may be behind the non-keynesian effects of fiscal adjustments, the
characteristics of expansionary fiscal consolidations are not completely clear. The descrip-
tion of these characteristics has remained as a matter for empirical work. Some studies, such
as Cour, Dubois, Mahfouz, and Pisani-Ferry (1996), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and
Giavazzi, Japelli, and Pagano (2000) find that large consolidations are most effective in in-
creasing growth. While Alesina and Perotti (1997) and subsequent studies by the same au-
thors emphasize instead the composition of the adjustment, and in particular the gains from
cutting transfers and other forms of unproductive spending, McDermott and Wescott (1996)
conclude that both the size and the composition of fiscal consolidations are important, which
is precisely what this article finds too.
Initial fiscal conditions and the other economic policies that accompany fiscal consoli-
dation may also play a role. While some studies find no evidence that these things are impor-
tant, other works 4 affirm that the initial level of debt, a currency depreciation preceding the
consolidation, wage restraint, and accompanying structural reforms, are all crucial factors
that can make fiscal consolidations expansionary or contractionary.
2.2. Fiscal Policy, Fiscal Adjustments and Income Distribution
While the theoretical and empirical literature that links fiscal policy to growth is abun-
dant, it is almost inexistent with regards to fiscal policy and income distribution 5. Nonethe-
less, the idea that there could exist a trade-off between policies that promote economic
growth and those that promote a fairer income distribution is an old hypothesis, that still
seems to hold pretty well today when fiscal policy is under discussion.
The reasoning behind this trade-off is that when welfare states implement policies that
redistribute income, they impose direct taxes that may distort the sound functioning of effi-
cient markets, which in turn will discourage private investment and will then have a negative
impact on productivity and economic growth (Przeworski, 1986; Boix, 1996). Therefore
public transfers of income and capital from the richer strata to the poorer strata of the popula-
tion would only be sustainable in the long run as long as the associated taxes to finance these
policies do not damage domestic productivity and the capital’s net rate of return. If the pro-
64 CARLOS MULAS-GRANADOSductivity and the rate of return are positive and higher than in other countries with lower
taxes, investors will still remain in the country. Both conditions are necessary to maintain
growth in the long-run with considerable public spending. In fact, these are the conditions
that have supported the generous welfare states in Europe until today.
The existence of this trade-off between growth and equality was widely accepted under
the paradigm of neoclassical economics up to the point that socialist governments in the
twenties were willing to abandon redistributive policies if they harmed the medium term rate
of economic growth (Boix, 1996). The substitution of this paradigm by the Keynesian one
offered a way to escape that zero-sum game. Keynesian economics affirmed that economic
growth was less a matter of supply conditions, and more a matter of aggregate demand. By
stimulating aggregate demand, output would grow, and full employment could be reached,
without very strong costs in terms of inflation. The combination of full employment policies
and public spending expansion to stimulate domestic consumption, offered a combination of
policies that were positive for both growth and equality.
Once these policies proved no longer applicable in the seventies, basically due to the in-
duced rigidities that they had generated in the aggregate supply, the neoclassical paradigm
dominated again the landscape of economic ideas. European Monetary Union (EMU) was
conceived under its direct influence, and as the empirical evidence in this article will show, it
has coincided with a rebirth of the old trade off. With aggregate demand locked by means of
a supranationalized monetary policy and the 3 percent deficit limit to fiscal policy, economic
growth has become again a question of supply-side economics. For social democratic gov-
ernments this means intervening in the provision of human and physical capital. For more
conservative governments this means lowering the taxes that disincentivate private invest-
ment, and reducing labor costs. In this framework again, direct transfers of income to the
worse-off (the very basis of the welfare state) are very much restricted by how much they
damage the capital’s rate of return, and how much they affect productivity. When too much
social spending reduces both, economic growth will be negatively affected and redistribution
policies will not be sustainable. Then, expenditure-based fiscal adjustments that arrive in
moments when budget deficits are harming productivity and private investment, are likely to
increase economic growth (via the positive supply-side mechanisms mentioned in section
2.1). However, this will be achieved at the cost of increasing income inequality.
Only the IMF and the World Bank have systematically studied the effect of stabilization
policies (that include serious fiscal adjustments) on both growth and equality in developing
countries. Their studies almost always have concluded that successful stabilization experi-
ences have increased economic growth and have reduced inequalities, normally as a «collat-
eral effect» of the general economic stabilization, and sometimes also helped by World
Bank’s poverty reduction programs (Tanzi, Chu, and Gupta, 1999). Nevertheless, the story
for industrial countries seems to be somewhat different. Among the very few studies that
have addressed the equity dimension of fiscal adjustments in advanced economies is the
work by Ford (1998) and Smeeding (1997, 2000), who find that recent fiscal consolidations
in OECD countries have run parallel to a widening in the distribution of incomes and poverty
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analysis is the topic of the rest of the article.
3. Research Design
From the theoretical review of the previous section, there are two set of alternative hy-
potheses that seem very reasonable and that are at the core of the questions that motivate this
article:
Hypotheses regarding the economic consequences of fiscal adjustments: H0 (null hypothe-
sis): The effect of fiscal adjustments on growth and income distribution are not the same
(have opposite sign); H1 (alternative hypothesis): These effects are the same on both growth
and income distribution.
Hypotheses regarding the effect of different fiscal adjustment strategies: H0 (null hypothe-
sis): expenditure-based and revenue-based fiscal adjustments have different results in terms
of economic growth and income distribution; H1 (alternative hypothesis): Expenditure-based
and revenue-based adjustments have the same effects on both variables.
In order to test these hypotheses, this article applies two simple but complementary ana-
lyses:
— Means analysis: This methodology selects a sample of adjustment episodes and
looks at the evolution of economic growth and income distribution (plus another set of eco-
nomic indicators) in the aftermath of each episode. To put it in context, average figures for
all episodes in the sample are compared in the periods immediately preceding and following
the adjustment episodes 6.
— Parametric estimation: This second methodological approach is based on bilateral
correlations and linear regressions of the main variables, using all datapoints in the sample.
For the regression analysis, the article takes the GDP growth rate as the dependent variable
and includes the annual change of the (primary) budget balance among a wider set of inde-
pendent variables and controls. In order to test the trade-off hypothesis, this article also esti-
mates a model for the determinants of income distribution, including an indicator of the com-
position of fiscal adjustments among the set of independent variables. Because this is an
article about the immediate economic consequences of fiscal consolidations, both parametric
models are conceived to capture short-run interactions and causality between the main vari-
ables, and do not focus on long-term dynamics that are difficult to attribute to the effect of
isolated fiscal adjustments.
Both methodologies complement each other. While the analysis of means deals with epi-
sodes of fiscal adjustment of more than one year, the parametric analysis does not introduce
any criteria for the selection of these episodes and simply links annual changes in the budget
balance between year t–1 and year t to the observed variations in the rate of growth or the in-
equality indexes in the same year or in subsequent years (t+1, t+2, ...t+n). In addition, while
the means analysis allows for a comprehensive description of the contemporaneous evolu-
66 CARLOS MULAS-GRANADOStion of a wider set of economic variables, the parametric analysis is restricted to the study of
the determinants of growth and income distribution. Most importantly, the parametric analy-
sis test for relationships of causality which can only be guessed tentatively using the analysis
of means or bilateral correlations.
A final word should be said about the research design before reporting the results ob-
tained from the application of both analyses. This article is not about the effect of income
distribution on growth 7, but about the effects of fiscal adjustments on economic growth and
income distribution. The paper does not try to establish any causality between the evolution
of economic growth and the previous or simultaneous evolution of income distribution.
What this article tests is the hypotheses that fiscal adjustments do not have the same impact
on growth and income distribution, especially if these adjustments have relied on spending
cuts. If these hypotheses are not rejected, then it is possible to affirm that policy-makers hav-
ing to decide on the composition of any fiscal consolidation face a trade-off between both
economic outcomes. This is the reason why the parametric analysis does not estimate a
model for the interaction between growth and income distribution, but it estimates separate
models for the determinants of each.
4. Results I: Means Analysis
From the 615 observations of the panel of 15 EU Member States between 1960 and
2000, I select a sub-sample of consolidation episodes 8. Episodes are selected according to
this criteria: episodes of fiscal adjustment are those years in which the cyclically adjusted
primary budget balance (CAPB) improved by at least 1.5 percent of GDP one year and was
followed by a positive figure in the subsequent or preceding year, or when the CAPB im-
proved at least 1.25 percent of GDP during two consecutive years 9. Using this standard defi-
nition to select episodes of fiscal adjustment, I have a sub-sample of 53 cases that can be di-
vided into 28 revenue-based adjustments and 25 expenditure-based adjustments 10.
The means analysis consists of looking at the average values of a wide range of eco-
nomic variables two years before the adjustment, during the adjustment episode, and two
years after the adjustment. The main reason for looking only at two-year intervals before and
after consolidation episodes is that in the longer-term the relationship between fiscal adjust-
ments and other economic variables is more difficult to identify, since the latter can be re-
flecting the impact of many other factors (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998). Also, in the section
that focuses on the nineties (a decade that concentrates 18 of the 53 episodes), the two-year
interval is motivated by the need to keep as many data points as possible to perform the ana-
lysis.
4.1. Results for the whole sample, 1960-2000
Fiscal adjustments occurred in Europe in the last four decades differ substantially: while
some relied on increases in revenues, others relied on spending cuts (Mulas-Granados, 2002,
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typically increase revenues from direct taxes to maintain public spending in public transfers,
public wages, and public investment. On the contrary, expenditure-based adjustments rely
mostly on cuts in transfers, wages and investment, and only increase direct taxes marginally
during the adjustment. This slight increase in revenues coming from direct taxation is, how-
ever, immediately reversed, once the adjustment comes to an end.
It is important to note that expenditure-based adjustments take place when the initial fis-
cal conditions in terms of public deficit and debt are very deteriorated 11. The debt to GDP
ratio, the level of expenditures and the overall budget deficit are systematically higher in the
two years previous to expenditure-based adjustments. This implies that governments facing
strong fiscal imbalances are more likely to undertake a fiscal adjustment based on spending
cuts.
The amelioration of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the reduction of total expenditures, and the
improvement of the budget balance is remarkable after expenditure-based adjustments,
while it is more moderate after revenue-based ones. In the latter cases, once the budget defi-
cit is under control and the consolidation episode comes to an end, the increase in revenues
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Table 1




Before During After Before During After
Fiscal Policy
Debt Ratio 47.44 55.05 61.60 60.37 59.62 69.26 65.11
6 Debt Ratio 0.87 2.32 2.34 1.03 4.36 1.67 0.04
Budget Balance –1.60 –4.41 –3.41 –2.95 –6.34 –4.11 –3.33
6 Budget Balance –0.29 –0.99 0.96 –0.32 –1.03 1.53 0.19
Total Revenues 39.19 40.89 43.22 44.89 46.18 46.48 44.09
6 Total Revenues 0.36 0.58 1.41 –0.08 0.22 0.78 –0.42
Total Direct Taxes 12.10 12.60 13.59 14.04 13.24 14.07 13.27
6 T. Direct Taxes 0.20 0.17 0.56 0.01 –0.03 0.31 –0.23
Total Expenditures 41.08 45.34 46.50 47.75 52.30 51.59 48.12
6 Total Expenditures 0.68 1.41 0.41 0.05 1.46 –0.81 –0.18
Total Transfers 14.60 15.75 16.46 16.23 17.75 17.25 16.46
6 T. Transfers 0.33 0.43 0.42 0.22 0.40 –0.34 –0.28
Total Public Wages 11.26 11.28 11.28 11.63 12.67 12.37 11.68
6 T. Public Wages 0.23 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.13 –0.29 0.04
Total Pub. Investment 3.33 3.54 3.28 3.42 3.48 2.82 2.72
6 T. P. Investment 0.06 0.06 –0.10 0.03 –0.01 –0.24 0.02
Source: Own elaboration from Means Analysis.that made the adjustment possible is then used to finance further increases in public transfers,
wages and investment. These two different strategies have been generally associated with
governments that have opposite economic preferences regarding the role of the public sector
in the economy (Mulas-Granados, 2002). However, these different strategies may not be
neutral (Garcia and Hénin, 1999), meaning that they may not have the same economic re-
sults.
As shown in table 2, GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, and inequality 12 behave
very differently depending on the type of adjustment implemented. Starting with initial
conditions, it is worth noting that GDP growth is lower before expenditure-based adjust-
ments than before revenue-based ones, and both are smaller than during years of non-ad-
justment. The same happens with unemployment and inflation rates. This means that gov-
ernments decide to undertake expenditure-based adjustments when domestic
macroeconomic conditions have worsened considerably, probably because it is only then
when public opinion is willing to accept the welfare cuts associated to expenditure-based
adjustments. As an example, the average unemployment rate before expenditure-based ad-
justments is 2.5 percentage points higher than before revenue-based ones. For inflation rate
and GDP growth, these differences are around 3 percent and 0.5 percent, higher and lower
respectively.
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Before During After Before During After
Macroeconomic Outcomes
Real GDP Growth 3.72 2.19 1.61 3.16 1.73 2.46 3.36
6 Real GDP Growth –0.11 –0.50 –0.11 0.50 –0.19 0.50 0.56
Unemployment Rate 5.32 6.14 7.02 6.96 8.76 9.08 8.41
6 Unemployment Rate 0.08 0.25 0.55 –0.02 0.63 0.04 –0.45
Price Index 73.33 91.76 116.56 128.86 117.89 133.50 120.93
6 Prices 3.71 6.80 7.03 6.70 9.36 7.53 6.75
Gini Coefficient 30.56 29.86 30.90 31.51 30.84 33.31 34.15
6 Gini Coefficient 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.03 0.31 0.47
Theil Index (c=1) 32.64 31.23 32.33 33.87 31.98 33.76 35.45
6 Theil Index 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.21 0.09 0.42 0.58
Ratio D9/D1 2.63 2.67 2.88 2.93 2.72 2.94 3.02
6 Ratio D9/D1 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.11
Source: Own elaboration from Means AnalysisIncreased growth follows after both revenue-based and expenditure-based consolida-
tions. However, during revenue-based consolidations there is a typical Keynesian temporary
recession that increases unemployment, and reduces the growth rate, while the opposite hap-
pens during expenditure-based adjustments. During and after the latter, growth increases and
unemployment is reduced. In the same way, inflation remains constant during and after reve-
nue-based consolidations, but decreases considerably in cases of expenditure-based adjust-
ments.
If expenditure-based adjustments perform better than revenue-based ones in terms of
growth, unemployment and inflation, they also have higher costs in terms of income inequal-
ity than do revenue-based ones. As table 2 shows, all indexes show that inequality increases
during and after both types of fiscal adjustments, but it is during and after expenditure-based
adjustments when these inequality indexes grow more, indicating a worsening in the income
distribution. These results confirm the latest contributions in this area, which point toward
important increases in income inequality by the end of the nineties, regardless of the type of
index employed to measure the distribution of income 13.
So far, the empirical evidence presented until now in tables 1 and 2 supports the argu-
ment that expansionary fiscal adjustments occur primarily when initial fiscal and economic
conditions have worsened considerably, and when the adjustment takes place on the spend-
ing side 14. These expenditure-based adjustments, although they can be expansionary and in-
crease economic growth, they have important costs in terms of increasing income inequality.
It remains unclear, however, whether the budget’s composition and initial economic
conditions are the only factors behind expansionary fiscal adjustments; it can be the case that
the size of the adjustment 15 and the accompanying monetary conditions can also play a role
in generating the economic expansion. Furthermore, it remains to be clarified whether these
expansionary fiscal adjustments work primarily through supply-side or demand-side mecha-
nisms.
With regards to the size of the adjustment, it may actually be a factor generating expan-
sionary fiscal consolidations, since the difference between the figures for the budget balance
«after» and «before» the adjustment is bigger in the case of expenditure-based expansionary
fiscal adjustments than in the case of revenue-based ones. Nevertheless, this effect does not
seem to be very important because the differences are small in comparison: expendi-
ture-based adjustments reduce the budget deficit by 2 average percentage points, while reve-
nue-based adjustments reduce the budget deficit by 1.5 percentage points.
The question of accompanying monetary conditions does seem to play a role too, but
again a very limited one. As shown in table 3, a nominal devaluation (increase in the ex-
change rate) accompanies both types of fiscal adjustments. This devaluation is however
maintained after expenditure-based consolidations but reversed after revenue-based ones.
With respect to short-term real interest rates, there seems to be no differences in their behav-
ior across types of adjustment, since they remain more or less constant before and during the
adjustment, and they only fall after expenditure-based ones, reflecting the lower risk-premia.
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composition of the budget, than on the size of the budget cut or the simultaneous expansion
of monetary conditions. It is true that monetary policy was slightly more relaxed during and
after expenditure-based expansionary adjustments, but this can also be reflecting the fact that
almost all expenditure-based fiscal consolidations that took place in the nineties started right
after the devaluations of 1992-93.
Once the macroeconomic results that different types if fiscal adjustments bring about
have been described, and once the type of initial and accompanying fiscal and monetary con-
ditions that influence those final outcomes have become clear, the last step in this analysis is
then to investigate the channels through which expansionary fiscal adjustments work. As can
be observed in table 4, economic expansion after expenditure-based fiscal consolidations is
mediated by a remarkable crowding-in of the private sector in the form of increasing con-
sumption and a boom of private investment.
This crowding-in is also present in revenue-based adjustments but is much less impor-
tant 16. This important crowding-in of the private sector in expansionary expenditure-based
consolidations is accompanied by higher profits and lower labor costs, which are at last
translated into an improvement of the trade balance. The argument behind the reduction in
labor costs that improves the budget balance, that increases profits and investment, thus con-
tributing to an increase in the level of output is the following: during expenditure-based ad-
justments, the government wage bill is reduced and there are no increases in direct taxes (that
principally rely on the labor factor). Both measures have the effect of reducing labor costs di-
rectly and indirectly by undermining the bargaining power of labor unions.
The truth is that this mechanism of diminishing labor costs that trigger expansionary fis-
cal adjustments should not be uniquely associated with expenditure-based fiscal adjust-
ments. In fact, this mechanism would also work for revenue-based fiscal adjustments as well,
if trade unions internalized the government’s budget constraint, or if they did not ask for an
increase in real salaries when taxes grew. This only happens in countries such as the United
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Before During After Before During After
Monetary Policy
Real Interest Rate (ShTerm) 1.85 3.02 3.11 3.11 3.04 2.95 2.62
6 Real Interest Rate 0.07 –0.44 –0.11 0.41 0.30 –0.17 –0.02
Real Exchange Rate 99.06 101.18 102.75 101.11 97.19 97.89 96.62
6 Real Exchange Rate –0.07 –0.27 0.50 –0.69 –0.12 0.64 0.87
Source: Own elaboration from Means Analysis.States or Canada, where trade unions are very weak, or in countries such as the Scandinavian
ones, where the high degree of corporatism and a centralized wage bargaining process have
traditionally made trade unions encompassing and collaborative with the government’s bud-
get constraint. Such labor market institutions allow these governments to balance their bud-
gets via revenues without damaging labor costs, domestic productivity and economic growth
(Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Alesina, Perotti and Tavares, 1998; Garrett 1998, and
Esping-Andersen, 1999). In other countries, trade unions are strong enough to protest and
demand higher salaries, but not enough to be able to control all wage demands across differ-
ent sectors of the economy 17.
Summing up, what the empirical evidence of this section has shown can be re-grouped
in three different sets of conclusions:
1. In the short-run, the composition of fiscal adjustments is a crucial factor determin-
ing the economic consequences of consolidation episodes. Expenditure-based adjustments
normally take place in situations of fiscal stress, with low GDP growth, high debt levels,
strong budget deficits and poor initial economic performance. When these consolidations
succeed in reducing the most rigid items of the budget, namely public transfers and public
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Before During After Before During After
Microeconomic Outcomes
Private Consumption 57.80 57.93 58.32 58.09 57.95 58.39 58.97
6 Private Consumption –0.09 –0.07 0.19 0.03 –0.02 0.23 0.37
Private Investment 18.66 17.63 18.22 18.01 17.35 18.16 19.26
6 Private Investment 0.02 –0.03 0.49 –0.40 0.05 0.55 0.76
Labor Costs Index 107.08 108.88 108.02 105.43 108.20 104.86 101.83
6 Labor Costs –0.13 0.48 –0.49 –1.39 –0.98 –1.85 –1.54
Profits Share 31.84 31.77 31.06 31.88 31.10 32.31 32.92
6 Profits Share 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.72 0.31
Trade Policy Outcomes
Imports 29.60 35.99 35.50 36.60 36.34 35.86 37.44
6 Imports 0.80 0.47 0.33 1.54 0.74 0.94 1.10
Exports 21.46 24.06 24.13 26.01 25.80 28.51 29.08
6 Exports 0.65 0.34 0.61 0.77 0.87 1.08 1.15
Trade Balance –0.36 –1.41 –0.25 –0.30 –1.77 0.67 0.68
6 Trade Balance –0.08 –0.20 –0.02 –0.11 0.31 0.95 0.20
Source: Own elaboration from Means Analysis.wages, they are expansionary. Their economic effects are to increase GDP growth, and re-
duce inflation and unemployment rates, but they do so at the cost of increasing income in-
equality more than what revenue-based adjustments do. Note that these results are important
for two strands of the economic literature: the one on the growth-equality trade-off, and the
one related to growth theory.
2. When fiscal adjustments are expansionary, non-Keynesian effects work through
both demand-side and supply-side mechanisms.
a) With respect to demand-side mechanisms, this section has provided evidence of the
existence of wealth effects, given that a cut in public consumption that is perceived as perma-
nent increases private consumption, because households discount future higher levels of dis-
posable income as a result of the expected reduction in taxes.
b) There are also credibility effects that benefit both private consumption and private
investment. When debt is high, interest rates are high and any deficit reduction, mostly if it is
based on spending cuts, reduces the risk premia, and consequently interest rates, facilitating
the crowding-in of private consumption and investment 18.
c) And with respect to the supply-side, the reduction in the government wage-bill
in unionized imperfectly labor markets proves crucial to reduce labor costs, to increase
business’s profits, and to improve the trade balance, thus contributing to the economic ex-
pansion.
3. Finally, the choice that governments planning to undertake a fiscal adjustment face
seems to lie between two extremes: one option is to undertake a revenue-based adjustment
that may not be so expansionary but that will prevent income inequality from raising dramat-
ically; and an alternative option is to pursue an expenditure-based strategy that may be ex-
pansionary but at the cost of increasing inequalities substantially. As shown by
Mulas-Granados (2002, 2003) this decision is heavily influenced by the rate of unemploy-
ment, by the structural budget balance in previous years, by the electoral calendar, by the
fragmentation of the cabinet, and most importantly, by the ideology of the party in govern-
ment.
4.2. Results for the nineties
During the nineties, the story for expansionary fiscal adjustments depicted in the previ-
ous section applies almost exactly. Revenue-based adjustments and expenditure-based ones
have had similar characteristics than those from previous decades. Similarly, they have also
had opposite economic consequences, in the short-run. While expenditure-based adjust-
ments in the nineties have shown better chances of increasing economic growth, reve-
nue-based ones have proved less likely to increase income inequality.
The driving forces leading to expansionary fiscal adjustments during the nineties have
also been a mix of supply-side and demand-side mechanisms of wealth effects, investment
boom and credibility effects. The process of strong deficit reduction in Europe, and the
Fiscal Adjustments and the Short-Term Trade-Off Between Economic Growth and Equality 73downward convergence of interest rates, maintained inflation at historically low levels, and
this curbed unit labor costs down following expenditure-based adjustments. The trade bal-
ance improved, and private investment and consumption boomed, increasing the GDP
growth rate in the EU 19.
5. Results II: Parametric Analysis
Although the means analysis performed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 already seem to confirm
the two hypotheses formulated in section 3, the statistical robustness of an analysis based on
averages needs to be enhanced with complementary techniques that establish correlations
among variables and directions of causality.
Simple Spearman-correlations between the two major measures of fiscal policy (the an-
nual change in the primary budget balanced, corrected and non corrected by the economic
cycle), and the four measures of economic policy outcomes (the GDP growth rate, the unem-
ployment rate, the inflation rate and the Gini coefficient) are reported in table 6.
As expected, the main correlations among important variables are statistically signifi-
cant: economic growth is negatively associated with fiscal adjustments and specially if those
are strong. Nevertheless, economic growth is positively correlated with better quality of the
budget 20, what seems to confirm a relationship between adjustments based on spending cuts
and economic growth. Unemployment is negatively associated with improvements in the
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Table 5




Before During After Before During After
Macroeconomic Outcomes
Real GDP Growth 2.74 1.96 2.26 2.66 1.74 2.56 3.61
6 Real GDP Growth 0.01 0.03 –0.04 0.25 0.42 0.13 0.30
Unemployment Rate 8.54 8.24 8.42 9.10 9.35 8.84 8.82
6 Unemployment Rate –0.03 0.21 0.21 –0.09 0.55 –0.08 –0.67
Price Index 163.69 155.88 193.75 212.96 172.81 170.31 162.85
6 Prices Index 6.11 8.14 8.48 8.80 10.67 6.94 6.29
Gini Coefficient 32.43 30.60 31.08 31.41 29.30 30.28 34.64
6 Gini Coefficient 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.24 0.65
Theil Index (c=1) 32.55 31.24 32.13 33.76 31.89 32.99 35.66
6 Theil Index 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.33 0.57
Ratio D9/D1 2.59 2.63 2.79 2.86 2.59 2.91 2.99
6 Ratio D9/D1 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.15
Source: Own elaboration from Means Analysis.budget balance, since higher unemployment means less public revenues and more expendi-
tures. By contrast, prices are positively associated with improvements in the budget balance,
meaning that monetary easing and fiscal adjustment work together. Finally, income inequal-
ity measured by the Gini coefficient is positively associated with improvements in the bud-
get balance.
With these correlations in hand, we obtain confirmation that most variables that appar-
ently moved simultaneously in the means analysis, are in fact significantly correlated. Nev-
ertheless, correlations can hide possible endogeneity problems because they do not establish
the direction of the relationships, nor they establish mechanisms of causality. For this pur-
pose, the regression analysis to be performed in the next two sub-sections is needed.
5.1. Results for Growth
To build a comprehensive statistical model for the determinants of economic growth is
beyond the purpose of this section. There is a long tradition of econometric studies that ana-
lyze the long-term impact of fiscal policy on growth 21, but what this section aims at doing is
simply to test if there exists a statistically significant positive relationship between fiscal ad-
justments and short-term increases in output, as previous sections have initially indicated.
Given that the objective for this section is very concrete, the statistical model is simple.
This model takes into account the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy as
the short-term determinants of output, as well as the relationships between output and mone-
tary and fiscal policies. The purpose of this design is to control for the existing endogeneity
between output, fiscal policy and monetary policy. The analysis of the monetary stance is not
of particular interest for this article, but it has to be included because it is part of the policy
mix and it performs a crucial role in determining output in the short-run.
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 Primary Budget Balance 1
 CAPB 0.77*** 1
Quality of Budget 0.16*** 0.15*** 1
Strength of Adjustment 0.74*** 0.93*** 0.22*** 1
 Real GDP Growth 0.14*** –0.17*** 0.10*** –0.13***
 Unemployment Rate –0.24*** 0.04 –0.06 –0.06
 Price Index 0.03 0.12*** –0.12*** 0.04
 Gini Coefficient 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.21***
Source: Own elaboration.Thus, this section estimates the following model for the interaction between fiscal pol-
icy, real output and monetary conditions, in a system of three endogenous variables 22.
6Yt = y(6Yt–1, 6Ft–1, 6Qt–1, 6Mt–1, 6GAPt) [1]
Mt = m(Mt–1, 6Ft, it–1, 6Yt, 6Ft–1) [2]
6Ft = f(6Ft–1, Mt–1, 6Yt, 6Yt–1, DEBTt, dummies) [3]
The GDP growth equation (1) is characterized by output being dependent only on its lag,
lagged change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance, lagged monetary policies,
lagged change in the quality of the budget, lagged output growth, and the change in the
EU-15 output gap 23. The monetary policy equation (2) has the real monetary conditions in-
dex 24 depending on its own lag, the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget bal-
ance, and its lag, output growth, and the lag of long term interest rate. Finally, the fiscal pol-
icy equation (3) describes the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a
function of its own lag, lagged monetary conditions, current and lagged domestic output
growth, and the debt-GDP ratio.
This model is estimated using a three-stage least squares estimator in order to take into
account any cross correlation between the various residuals which may reflect some of the
behavior of the variables which had to be omitted from the panel estimation. Robust standard
errors were estimated to account for heteroskedasticity and any remaining serial correlation.
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Table 7
The Effects of Fiscal Adjustments on Economic Growth
Growth Equation





Real GDP Growth t-1 0.253*** 0.562***
(3.76) (6.79)
Monetary Conditions Index t-1 –0.242** –0.489***
(1.91) (2.88)
6 Output Gap (UE-15) 0.677*** 0.793***
(8.01) (3.55)
6 Cyclic. Adj. Primary Budget Balance t-1 –0.101 –0.078
(1.40) (0.57)





Adj. R-squared 0.31 0.46
LR Chi 2(7) 72.66 110.71
Prob>Chi 2 0.000 0.000As results in table 7 show, during the seventies and the eighties, GDP growth was
strongly positively affected by its own lag, and by the surrounding cyclical conditions in the
EU. It was negatively affected by monetary and fiscal contractions, although the coefficient
for the change in the fiscal stance is not statistically significant. These effects were all rein-
forced in the nineties. GDP growth became even more dependent on its lag and on the aver-
age EU output gap, what reflects the growing interdependence of European economies. It
was also more negatively affected by monetary contractions, meaning that devaluations
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Monetary Policy Equation






Monetary Conditions Index t-1 0.653*** 0.612***
(8.67) (7.27)
6 Cyclic. Adj. Primary Budget Balance 0.267*** 0.201***
(3.11) (2.96)
6 Cyclic. Adj. Primary Budget Balance t-1 0.187*** 0.098***
(3.77) (3.02)
Real GDP Growth –0.101 –0.112*
(1.57) (1.77)





Adj. R-squared 0.26 0.29
LR Chi 2(7) 132.12 131.14
Prob>Chi 2 0.000 0.000
Fiscal Policy Equation
D. Variable:  Cyclically Adjusted
Primary Budget Balance (CAPB)
 CAPB (1970-1989)  CAPB (1990-2000)
6 CAPB t-1 –0.312*** 0.009
(4.76) (0.04)
Monetary Conditions Index t-1 –0.311*** –0.134
(3.24) (1.22)
Real GDP Growth 0.165*** 0.321
(1.98) (1.23)
Real GDP Growth t-1 0.087* 0.146
(1.64) (1.38)





Adj. R-squared 0.37 0.29
LR Chi 2(7) 82.46 82.91
Prob>Chi 2 0.000 0.000
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
Table 7
The Effects of Fiscal Adjustments on Economic Growthand/or falling interest rates had a bigger positive impact in increasing growth during the
nineties than they had before. What is most striking is that the impact of fiscal consolidations
on growth became much less negative during the nineties. Also, the positive impact that the
quality of the budget had on growth before 1990, was reinforced in the following decade.
These two results confirm that non-Keynesian effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolida-
tions applied even better during the nineties than in previous decades, as shown already in
section 4.2 using means analysis.
5.2. Results for Income Distribution
The purpose of this final section is to perform a parametric estimation of the determi-
nants of income distribution in Europe. Results should help us confirm or reject the initial
evidence from previous sections according to which fiscal adjustments worsen the distribu-
tion of income, mostly if they are expenditure-based.
There exists a variety of potential determinants of income distribution, but since the pur-
pose of this exercise is limited to the effect of fiscal policies on inequality, the equation be-
low includes only the basic factors 25:
6It = i(6It–1, 6Ft–1, 6Qt–1, DTt–1, SSt–1, Educt–1, dummies) [4]
In the expression above, the change in the income distribution (measured by the Gini
and the Theil indexes) depends on its lag, on the lagged change of the cyclically adjusted
budget balance, the lagged change of the quality of the budget, the lagged share of direct
taxes to GDP, the lagged share of social spending to GDP, and the lagged share of people en-
rolled in secondary education.
The lagged change in the budget balance and the quality of the budget should capture the
effects of fiscal adjustments on income distribution. In addition, the inclusion of the share of
direct taxes and the share of social spending in the equation attempts to control for the differ-
ent degrees of welfare state development in different member states: more developed welfare
states use higher social spending and higher direct taxation to redistribute income, what
should be reflected in the evolution of the Gini and Theil indexes. The share of social spend-
ing also serves to capture the effect that globalization may have had on the distribution of in-
come. According to some authors 26, recent economic globalization may be responsible for
increased income inequalities in the nineties, because this process has imposed cuts in wel-
fare spending as a means of gaining external competitiveness. A quick look to the evolution
of social spending and income distribution in Europe during the Maastricht years seems to
support such hypothesis.
Some cases in table 8 are specially relevant in this respect, such as those of Finland,
Austria, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. In all of them, strong reductions in social
spending were accompanied by remarkable increases in income inequality. There are some
cases, however, that did not follow the same pattern. France and Germany, for example, are
two cases where income inequality increased in spite of moderate increases in transfers.
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French case remains unclear. Something similar, but with an opposite sign, happened with
Denmark, the only country were inequalities were importantly reduced during the nineties in
spite of a serious retrenchment in public transfers.
Equation (4) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares with panel-corrected standard er-
rors to deal with panel heteroskedasticity, spatial and serial correlation 27.
Results are reported in table 9 and show that ameliorations in the budget balance and the
quality of the budget increase both the Gini and the Theil indexes. The strongly significant
impact of the latter is very important because the «quality» variable is a proxy for expendi-
ture-based adjustments. Better quality budgets are those in which cuts in primary spending
contribute most to the fiscal consolidation, and are significantly associated with a widening
in the distribution of income. These results are coherent with the negative impact that lower
shares of social spending have on inequality, and confirm that fiscal adjustments have oppo-
site effects in terms of growth and income distribution, specially if they are based on spend-
ing cuts. That opposite effect becomes graphically very clear in Figure 1, where economic
growth and income distribution (measured by the Gini coefficient) are plotted against the
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Austria 1.1 –0.6 0.3 0.4 –0.1
Belgium 0.4 –1.2 –0.7 –0.3 –0.4
Denmark –1.6 –1.1 –2.1 0.1 –2.0
France 0.1 0.2 –0.3 –0.1 –0.3
Finland 1.4 –4.3 –2.5 –0.9 –1.6
Germany 0.2 0.6 –0.1 0.1 –0.3
Greece –0.2 0.7 –0.1 –0.1 0.0
Italy 1.5 –0.9 –0.4 –0.2 –0.2
Ireland 0.4 –2.3 –0.6 0.0 –0.7
Luxembourg –0.2
The Netherlands 0.5 –2.9 –1.2 –0.7 0.2
Portugal –0.2 0.7 –0.1 –0.2 0.0
Spain 0.6 –2.3 –2.3 –0.1 –2.2
Sweden 0.4 –3.5 –1.2 –0.4 –0.6
UK 0.9 –1.3 –0.8 0.0 –0.8
EU-15 0.3 –0.4** –0.6 –0.1 –0.5
Source: Own elaboration. Data on social spending from EC (2001: 25). Data on Income Inequality from Smeeding
(2000) and WIID (2000). Note: Figures show changes between 1993 and 1997, all measured in terms of GDP, ex-
cept the change in income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.
* Transfers to working age people. Includes unemployment, plus disability benefits, plus social assistance.
** Weighted by Real GDP share in 1997, excluding Luxembourg.change in the primary budget balance. As can be observed, the more consolidations rely on
spending cuts, the more unequal is the distribution of income.
Finally, the other variables included in equation (4) show the expected signs but are not
statistically significant. In this respect, the share of direct taxes and the education level are all
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Table 9
The Effects of Fiscal Adjustments on Income Distribution
Income Distribution Equation





6 Gini Coefficient t-1 0.134*** 0.142***
(3.31) (3.56)
6 Cyclic. Adj. Primary Budget Balance t-1 0.253*** 0.133**
(1.98) (1.88)
6 Quality of the Budget t-1 0.432*** 0.431***
(4.59) (4.37)
Direct Taxes (% GDP) t-1 –0.078 –0.099
(1.43) (1.36)
Social Spending (% GDP) t-1 –0.101* –0.099*
(1.81) (1.88)





Adj. R-squared 0.35 0.32
LR Chi 2(7) 85.32 98.72
Prob>Chi 2 0.000 0.000
Income Distribution Equation






6 Theil Index t-1 0.112*** 0.134***
(3.11) (3.28)
6 Cyclic. Adj. Primary Budget Balance t-1 0.204*** 0.132**
(2.01) (1.86)
6 Quality of the Budget t-1 0.366*** 0.402***
(4.14) (4.02)
Direct Taxes (% GDP) t-1 –0.086 –0.108
(1.34) (1.23)
Social Spending (% GDP) t-1 –0.096* –0.098*
(1.92) (1.92)




Adj. R-squared 297 163
LR Chi 2(7) 0.36 0.31
Prob>Chi 2 88.12 96.15
0.000 0.000
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
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Coef = -.0971; T = -1.74;Adj. R-Squared = 0.10; N = 34
Variation of Primary Budget Balance (%GDP)
10positively associated with ameliorations in the distribution of income, but do not have a sig-
nificant impact.
6. Conclusion
The clearest and most comprehensive way to conclude this article and summarize all the
empirical evidence presented until now, is to affirm that different strategies of fiscal adjust-
ment bring about different economic consequences in the short-term.
Expenditure-based adjustments that are preceded by bad economic and fiscal initial con-
ditions, that are accompanied by a currency devaluation, and that succeed in cutting the least
productive expenditures of the budget, are likely to have anti-Keynesian effects and to be ex-
pansionary. Nevertheless, they do so at the expense of increasing income inequality. The op-
posite is true for revenue-based consolidations.
For expansionary fiscal adjustments to take place, demand-side effects in the form of
crowding-in of the private sector, as well as supply-side effects in the form of lower labor
costs and increased investment, usually take place simultaneously. The signal that expendi-
ture-based adjustments send to private agents inform about the commitment of the govern-
ment to a sustained fiscal effort, and this produces a credibility effect that is crucial for ex-
pansionary fiscal adjustments to take place.
The nineties epitomize the story of expansionary fiscal consolidations, but also the re-
birth of the trade-off between growth and equality, mediated by fiscal policy. Since fiscal ad-
justments imposed by the Maastricht criteria arrived in a moment of fiscal stress for the pub-
lic finances across Europe, credible spending cuts succeeded in attracting private investment
and consumption, and therefore accelerated growth in the short-term. However, the negative
side of the strongest episode of fiscal adjustment in Europe in the last three decades has been
the progressive widening of income distribution and the increase in inequalities that have
reached in the nineties its higher levels as well.
In this respect, future choices by policy-makers between revenue-based and expendi-
ture-based adjustments should be informed by their likely opposite consequences. Being
aware of the trade-off between growth and equality presented in this article, future strategies
of fiscal consolidation will depend on the relative preferences that governments may have
over both economic policy objectives.
Notas
1. Since the original work by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), other scholars such as Alesina and Perotti (1997),
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001) have expanded the literature on ex-
pansionary fiscal consolidations. See Appendix 1 for a detailed revision of all these studies.
2. See section 3 for a detailed formulation of the null and alternative hypotheses tested in this article.
82 CARLOS MULAS-GRANADOS3. In this respect, the article that I take as the main reference for the first sections of this paper is Alesina and
Ardagna (1998).
4. For example, OECD (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Perotti (1999).
5. Lately there has been an effort to evaluate the effect that tax and expenditure policies have in the distribution
of income. For example, Ayala, Martínez and Ruiz-Huerta (1999), and Chu, Davoodi and Gupta (2000) find
that social spending has a strong and significant impact in reducing inequalities (especially public health spen-
ding, pensions, and primary-secondary education spending). Taxes have however an indirect and limited im-
pact in reducing inequalities. These findings have been confirmed by Oliver, Ramos and Raymond (2001) for
the Spanish case.
6. This is the most popular approach in the literature. See for example: Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and
Ardagna (1998), and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998). These authors compare the average values of the
main variables two or three years before the adjustment takes place with those from two or three years after the
adjustment. None of them has however looked at the evolution of income distribution.
7. This literature is enormous, ranging from the original theoretical works of Kuznets (1955) and Williamson
(1965), to the most recent empirical works of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) or Pe-
rotti (1996). Some works include very informative revisions of the literature in this field: see for example,
Aghion, Caroli and García-Penalosa (1999).
8. All data used in this article is from AMECO (2003), the macroeconomic database of the European Commis-
sion.
9. This is the same criteria used for the selection of adjustment episodes in the most important articles in this
field. See for example, Alesina-Ardagna (1998), Perotti and Kontopoulus (2002), Mulas-Granados (2002,
2003). Also see Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Maroto and Mulas-Granados (2002) for a discussion on the
sensitivity of results to different fiscal adjustment definitions.
10. An episode of fiscal adjustment is considered to be revenue-based when more than half of the contribution to
average deficit reduction during the episode of adjustment comes from an increase in the average total reve-
nues during the episode. The opposite applies to expenditure-based adjustments.
11. This confirms the findings of Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001) who showed that the probability of star-
ting a fiscal adjustment raised when the public debt increased.
12. Data on inequality comes from the World Income Inequality Database of the United Nations (2000), and has
been completed for some years and some countries with the database from the Luxembourg Income Study
Group (2001). Overlapping three-year moving averages have been used to fill out the gaps in the series. The
Gini and Theil coefficients as expressed in these databases run from 0 to 100. They equal 0 when the distribu-
tion of income is completely egalitarian, and they equal 100 when it is completely inegalitarian and one person
holds all the income in a society. Besides the Gini and Theil coefficients, calculations also include the ratio
between the highest and the lowest deciles. Both databases (WIID and LIS) contain comparable data in terms
of equivalent disposable household income, which includes all income obtained by families from any source
(work, property, capital, private transfers, social security benefits, etc), applying an equivalent scale of para-
meter of 0.5 to family income figures in order to take into account differences in the sizes of households.
«Although other, and possibly better, indicators may exist on the economic situation of households than dispo-
sable monetary income, it is though this variable the one that provides an adequate basis for comparison
among the countries selected (advanced economies)» (Ruíz-Huerta, Martínez and Ayala, 1999: 3)
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n13. See for example, Gottchalk, Gustaffson, and Palmer (1997); Danzinger and Reid (1999); Ford (1998); Atkin-
son (2000); Smeeding (2000); Freeman (2000), Álvarez, Prieto and Salas (2002).
14. Note that these results are very similar to those reported by Alesina and Ardagna (1998), and all other similar
studies collected in Appendix 1. Note also that the importance of bad initial fiscal conditions in generating ex-
pansionary fiscal adjustments, while very much stressed in studies dealing with advanced economies (Perotti,
1999; Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000), it has been also corroborated in studies dealing with low-income
countries (Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and Mulas-Granados, 2002).
15. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) argue that a large adjustment, by inducing a permanent change of fiscal regime,
can be expansionary because expectations are less susceptible to be affected by smaller adjustments.
16. See Argimón, González-Páramo, and Roldán (1997) for similar evidence on crowding-in after fiscal adjust-
ments.
17. According to Alesina and Perotti (1997b), in such cases where trade unions are not weak nor strong enough, a
1 percent increase in the income tax, increases labor costs in 2 percent.
18. Note that the size of the increase in private consumption depends on the absence of liquidity-constrained con-
sumers (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998), and therefore, as noted by Perotti (1999), the result hinges on the effi-
ciency of financial markets, and should be stronger when fiscal consolidation occurs in bad times when the
debt-to-GDP ratio is growing rapidly. For similar previous arguments in this respect, see also Blanchard
(1990) and Bertola and Drazen (1993).
19. These conclusions are based on the calculations that replicate tables 1, 3 and 4, now estimated only for the
sub-sample of adjustment episodes occurred during the nineties. These tables are not included in the text follo-
wing the editor’s indications, due to space constraints. Nonetheless, they are available from the author.
20. Quality of the budget is a variable that measures the contribution of primary expenditures to the total ameliora-
tion of the budget balance.
21. See for example Barro (1990, 1991), Easterly, Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), Tanzi and Zee (1996),
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), and Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997).
22. The model replicates the baseline specification of the one proposed by Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001).
Note, however, that they used a sample of 19 OECD countries for the period 1965-1995, while this article uses
a sample of 15 EU Member States for the period 1960-2000, with data from the AMECO database.
23. Measured as the difference between aggregate demand and potential output, as defined by the European Com-
mission in the AMECO database.
24. The stance of monetary policy is measured by the Monetary Conditions Index built specifically for this purpo-
se. The index is the sum of the short-term real interest rate and the real exchange rate, each weighted by its
sample standard deviation.
25. For a more detailed review of the potential factors that affect income distribution see Chu, Davoodi and Gupta
(2000).
26. See for example (Garrett, 1998; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001).
27. For details on this technique, see Beck and Katz (1995, 1996). According to Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
(2001: 18), «the use of panel-corrected standard errors usually produces rather conservative results, since it
tends to increase the standard errors of the estimates. Moreover, the inclusion of dummy variables tends to de-
flate the statistical significance of the other regressors (...) this carries some risk that causal hypotheses will be
rejected prematurely. On the other hand, it also increases our confidence that results which do emerge as signi-
ficant are not the consequence of unsound statistical assumptions or inappropriate econometric methods».
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Resumen
Este artículo examina el efecto económico a corto plazo que tienen distintas estrategias de ajuste fiscal, prestando es-
pecial atención a sus efectos sobre el crecimiento económico y la distribución de la renta. Utilizando una muestra de
53 episodios de ajuste fiscal ocurridos entre 1960 y 2000 en los 15 Estados Miembros de la UE, este artículo de-
muestra que diferentes estrategias de ajuste fiscal tienen diferentes consecuencias económicas. Las estrategias de
ajuste basadas en el recorte de los gastos que están precedidas de malas condiciones económicas y fiscales, que se
aplican junto con una devaluación, y que reducen sustancialmente las partidas menos productivas del presupuesto,
tienden a generar efectos positivos no keynesianos sobre el crecimiento. Sin embargo, estos efectos se logran a costa
de producir incrementos en las desigualdades. Justo lo contrario ocurre con los ajustes basados en incrementos de in-
gresos. Los años noventa son el ejemplo paradigmático de los ajustes fiscales con efectos anti-keynesianos expansi-
vos, a través de fuertes efectos riqueza y efectos de credibilidad. Al mismo tiempo los años noventa son testigos del
renacimiento del viejo dilema entre crecimiento e igualdad, ahora mediado por la política fiscal y las diferentes es-
trategias de ajuste.
Palabras clave: Ajuste fiscal, crecimiento económico, igualdad, composición presupuestaria.
Clasificación JEL: E62, E23, H30, H50.
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e
s
i
n
a
,
A
r
d
a
g
n
a
,
P
e
r
o
t
t
i
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
i
a
n
t
a
r
e
l
l
i
(
1
9
9
9
)
1
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
c
u
t
i
n
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
l
e
a
d
s
t
o
0
.
2
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
a
f
t
e
r
i
m
p
a
c
t
,
a
n
d
0
.
8
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
a
f
t
e
r
5
y
e
a
r
s
,
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
f
o
r
1
p
e
r
-
c
e
n
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
l
a
b
o
r
t
a
x
e
s
;
l
a
r
g
e
r
e
f
-
f
e
c
t
s
f
o
r
c
u
t
s
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
w
a
g
e
s
.
T
a
x
a
n
d
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
a
f
f
e
c
t
l
a
b
o
r
c
o
s
t
s
,
a
n
d
h
e
n
c
e
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
a
n
d
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
C
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
i
s
c
r
u
c
i
a
l
.
P
e
r
o
t
t
i
(
1
9
9
9
)
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
h
o
c
k
s
h
a
v
e
K
e
y
n
e
s
i
a
n
e
f
-
f
e
c
t
s
w
i
t
h
l
o
w
d
e
b
t
o
r
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
s
,
b
u
t
n
o
n
-
K
e
y
n
e
s
i
a
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
w
i
t
h
h
i
g
h
d
e
b
t
o
r
d
e
f
i
c
i
t
s
;
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
o
n
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
s
w
i
t
c
h
w
i
t
h
t
a
x
s
h
o
c
k
s
i
s
l
e
s
s
s
t
r
o
n
g
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
(
o
t
h
e
r
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s
n
o
t
t
e
s
t
e
d
)
.
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
f
i
s
c
a
l
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
c
r
u
c
i
a
l
;
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
i
s
a
l
s
o
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
.
G
i
a
v
a
z
z
i
,
J
a
p
p
e
l
l
i
,
a
n
d
P
a
g
a
n
o
(
2
0
0
0
)
N
o
n
-
K
e
y
n
e
s
i
a
n
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
s
b
y
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
m
o
r
e
l
i
k
e
l
y
w
h
e
n
f
i
s
c
a
l
i
m
p
u
l
s
e
s
a
r
e
l
a
r
g
e
a
n
d
p
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
/
s
a
v
i
n
g
(
o
t
-
h
e
r
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s
n
o
t
t
e
s
t
e
d
)
S
i
z
e
a
n
d
p
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
m
o
s
t
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
;
b
u
t
n
o
t
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
f
i
s
c
a
l
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
N
o
n
-
K
e
y
n
e
s
i
a
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
l
a
r
g
e
r
f
o
r
c
h
a
n
-
g
e
s
i
n
t
a
x
e
s
t
h
a
n
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
,
a
n
f
o
r
c
o
n
-
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
r
a
t
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
O
w
n
e
l
a
b
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
I
M
F
(
2
0
0
0
:
2
0
-
2
1
)
.
T
a
b
l
e
A
.
1
(
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
a
c
i
ó
n
)
C
r
o
s
s
-
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
o
f
E
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
a
r
y
F
i
s
c
a
l
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s